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Abstract
Introduction: Although incident reporting systems are widespread in health care as a strategy to re-
duce harm to patients, the focus has been on reporting incidents rather than responding to them.
Systems containing large numbers of incidents are uniquely placed to raise awareness of, and
then characterize and respond to infrequent, but signiﬁcant risks. The aim of this paper is to outline
a framework for the surveillance of such risks, their systematic analysis, and for the development and
dissemination of population-based preventive and corrective strategies using clinical and human
factors expertise.
Requirements for a population-level response: The framework outlines four system requirements:
to report incidents; to aggregate them; to support and conduct a risk surveillance, review and
response process; and to disseminate recommendations. Personnel requirements include a non-
hierarchical multidisciplinary team comprising clinicians and subject-matter and human factors
experts to provide interpretation and high-level judgement from a range of perspectives. The risk
surveillance, review and response process includes searching of large incident and other databases
for howandwhy things have gonewrong, narrative analysis by clinical experts, consultationwith the
health care sector, and development and pilot testing of corrective strategies. Criteria for deciding
which incidents require a population-level response are outlined.
Discussion: The incremental cost of a population-based response function ismodest comparedwith
the ‘reporting’ element. Combining clinical and human factors expertise and a systematic approach
underpins the creation of credible risk identiﬁcation processes and the development of preventive
and corrective strategies.
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‘While it seems obvious that collecting data and not analyzing it is
of little value, the most common failure of governmentally run re-
porting systems is to require reporting but not to provide the re-
sources needed to analyse the reports. Huge numbers of reports
are collected only to sit in boxes or on computers. Expertise is a
major, and essential, resource requirement for any reporting
system . . .
Ultimately, it is human experts who must translate the knowledge
gleaned from aggregated reports into meaningful recommenda-
tions for action to improve care.’WorldHealth Organisation, 2005
Introduction
A high rate of health care-associated harm is a consistent ﬁnding
across health systems in developed and developing countries [1–3].
Many governments, health departments and private organizations
have implemented incident reporting systems (IRSs) across net-
works of their health care facilities [4, 5] as part of a strategy to re-
duce this harm. Investment in these systems has been considerable
[6, 7], but the focus, at a population level, has been on reporting
problems rather than responding to them [7–9]. Learning from
and responding to things that go wrong has also been lacking for
collections of complaints, medico-legal ﬁles and coroners’ recom-
mendations [10, 11].
Widespread acceptance of incident reporting and improvements in
the ease of reporting with web-based IRSs has resulted in some systems
collecting large numbers of incidents, albeit mainly from hospitals. For
example, annually >1.5 million incidents are collected in England and
Wales [12], 200 000 in the US state of Pennsylvania [13] and 100 000
in the Australian state of New SouthWales [14]. Satisfactory processes
for local responses to individual incidents have been developed in
many organizations [4]. However, systems to realize the potential
for gaining a rich understanding of the full range of things that go
wrong at a population level are largely undeveloped [8].
Notwithstanding considerable progress in the use of additional
methods, such as case note review [15, 16], automated data extraction
[17], observational and ethnographic studies [18, 19] and the routine
collection of safety metrics [20], to characterize the nature and antece-
dents of common types of incidents, there are still untapped beneﬁts of
large collections of incidents. These retain a unique capacity to identify
and understand infrequently occurring patient safety risks, which are
unlikely to be characterized at a hospital or local level [21]. They can
also provide early warnings of the inevitable yet unforeseen new risks
associated with changes in health care practices and the introduction
of new technologies [22, 23]. Indeed, analyses of large collections, to-
gether with other sets of information about things that have gone
wrong, are likely to be the only way to gain insight into these risks
[21]. Although clinical case reports have a place in promoting debate
on rare events, large collections allow identiﬁcation of common contrib-
uting factors or repeated patterns of error by collating incidents from
multiple institutions [4, 11] (Boxes 1–3 [24–26]). However, being infre-
quent does not mean being insigniﬁcant, as these types of incidents may
result in substantial harm to patients at a population level [21]. There is,
thus, a strong case for developing preventive and corrective strategies for
low-frequency risks at regional or national level.
In this paper, we outline a framework for using clinical expertise to
recognize, respond to and reduce risks at a population level. This has
been informed by the experiences of the authors in managing
large-scale IRSs in Australia, the United Kingdom andNorth America.
The framework comprises system and personnel requirements and a
multistaged risk surveillance, review and response process.
Requirements for a population-level response
function
System requirements
There are four system requirements. First, a means for reporting in-
cidents that is available to all health care workers and is adequately
resourced, non-punitive, independent and conﬁdential [8, 10, 27].
Second, software to aggregate incidents and other information
from multiple sources and institutions. This may directly collect in-
formation in one database (e.g. Pennsylvania [13], New SouthWales
[6]) or upload it from independent systems into a central repository
(such as the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in
England and Wales). Third, a system for the production and man-
agement of reports for each stage of the risk surveillance, review
and response process (Fig. 1); this may be facilitated by workﬂow
Box 2Analertwith corrective strategy recommendations [25]
Nasogastric feeding tubes are commonly used for pa-
tients with dysphagia or those on ventilators. Such pa-
tients can be harmed if the tube is mistakenly inserted,
or later becomes displaced, into a bronchus. The NPSA re-
leased an alert in 2005 [25] on the need to conﬁrm correct
placement. However, the NRLS subsequently received re-
ports of 21 deaths and 79 cases of harm due to lung con-
tamination from feeding ﬂuid into bronchi, mainly
associated with misinterpretation of conﬁrmatory X rays
(12 deaths and 45 cases of harm). The focus of a new
Alert released in 2011 supports safe X-ray interpretation.
Other factors contributing to harm were: feeding despite
obtaining aspirate with pH between 6 and 8 (two deaths,
seven incidents), instilling water down the tube before as-
pirating (two incidents) and no check of tube placement at
all (one death, nine incidents). A repeated ﬁnding was no
written record of pH of aspirate or X-ray conﬁrmation of
placement.
The recommendations included having a named clinic-
al lead, auditing compliance, assessing staff competen-
cies, the purchase of radio-opaque nasogastric tubes
and avoiding placement of the tubes ‘out-of-hours’ unless
urgent.
Box 1 An example of clinical expertise informing develop-
ment of corrective strategies [24]
Adult urinary catheters are manufactured in two sets of
lengths: female (20–26 cm) and male (40–45 cm). Mis-
selection of a female length for a male can cause urethral
trauma and haemorrhage when the retention balloon is
inﬂated. The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) lo-
cated 114 of such incidents and reviewed them with a
view to developing national corrective strategies. Most in-
cident reports did not provide sufﬁcient information on
contributing factors. It took clinical insight into anatomy,
indicators for catheterization and labelling and storage
on a typical hospital ward to identify this risk that could
be addressed through controls on how catheters were la-
belled and stocked.
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and document management software. Fourth, a system to dissemin-
ate corrective strategies to health care organizations is essential (see
Fig. 1, Stage 8).
Personnel requirements
A multidisciplinary team comprising clinicians, subject experts (e.g.
pharmacists and biomedical engineers) and human factor experts
should be assembled to advise and manage the risk surveillance, re-
view and response process (Fig. 1). The meaning of many incident re-
ports can be gleaned only through interpretation and the application
of high levels of judgement from a range of perspectives (Box 1). Clin-
icians’ understanding of typical workﬂows and health care organiza-
tions’ operations play an important role in their ability to interpret
incidents [28, 29]. Subject-matter experts assist in understanding the
patterns of contributing and contextual factors [29]. Human factors per-
sonnel can advise on common error mechanisms [30] and the develop-
ment of corrective strategies which are ‘strong’ [31] and sustainable.
Personnel with a range of experience and specialties should be in-
cluded in discussions that are open and non-hierarchical. For example,
a wrong dose error in a neonatal intensive care unit will prompt differ-
ent responses from a pharmacist, a neonatal nurse, a junior doctor and
a human factors expert. Only by seeing the story through multiple
lenses can the true nature of the systems weaknesses be revealed
[32]. Subjecting the composition of the team and interim conclusions
to peer review and seeking constructive challenge are also desirable.
Risk surveillance, review and response process
We have outlined nine stages of a risk surveillance, review and re-
sponse process (‘the review process’) (Fig. 1); however, not all of
these are necessary for some types of risks. For urgent risks, the entire
process can be completed within a week. The multidisciplinary team
can provide expertise, as necessary, at each stage. An example of a risk
managed through these stages is shown in Box 4 [33–37].
Stage 1: Undertake surveillance. Categorical or free-text algo-
rithms can extract those incidents more likely to be candidates for a
national (or population-based) response from the incident database.
Given that tens or hundreds or thousands of incidents may be reported
each year, those associated with serious harm may be prioritized.
Other sources, such as media, coroner’s and medico-legal reports may
also be scanned for potential serious risks.
Stage 2: Identify a ‘trigger’ incident. Narratives should be read by
an experienced set of clinicians to determine if a ‘trigger’ incident or
cluster of incidents merits a population-level response. Criteria to de-
termine which incidents, or clusters, should qualify are outlined in
Box 5 and have evolved through experience; these criteria should be
considered at each stage of the review process.
Stage 3: Collect like-incidents. For trigger incidents which may
meet the population-level response criteria, searches of the database
should be conducted for similar events. The aim is for estimates to
be made of the frequency and severity of the consequences of the
type of incident in question. If there is evidence of signiﬁcant patient
harm, the literature and other available sources can be searched for
similar incidents. Opinions and anecdotes may also be sought from ex-
perienced clinicians and administrators.
Stage 4: Characterize the relevant incident type. The collected in-
cidents should be subjected to categorical and free-text analyses, in-
cluding iterative theme-based analyses of the narratives. The
categories in the International Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety
(ICPS) [38] (e.g. contributing factors, method of detection and miti-
gating factors) can provide a framework for such an analysis.
Figure 1 Stages of the population-level risk surveillance, review and response
process.
Box 3 An example of an information-only Alert [26]: over-
dose of intravenous paracetamol in infants and children
In 2010, the NPSA received a number of concerns from
anaesthetists, risk managers and pharmacists relating to
incidents of inadvertent intravenous paracetamol over-
dose in children. A search of the NRLS identiﬁed 206 rele-
vant incidents associated with 44 neonates and 162
children resulting in two cases of severe harm, 14 cases
of moderate harms and the remainder of low or no harm.
Incident themes included:
• lack of awareness amongst health care professionals
of neonatal and paediatric drug dosage regimens;
• patients receiving doses of paracetamol in both theatre
and wards due to poor documentation;
• human error relating to setting up infusion pumps to
administer intravenous paracetamol (incorrect rates
or volumes to be infused);
• confusion between dosing regimens with clinical staff
believing doses for oral and intravenous paracetamol
are interchangeable;
• ten times dose calculation errors in both the prescrip-
tion and administration of intravenous paracetamol.
The NPSA did not issue new recommendations, but re-
ferred to the MHRA Drug Safety Bulletin, released in July
2010. The Bulletin advised that dose should be based on
weight and provided recommended dosing regimens. It
also advised that for infants and children weighing
<33 kg, the 50 ml vial should be used for administration.
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A thorough understanding of themes arising from the analysis may
suggest which categories of the ICPS should be targeted for preventive
and/or corrective strategies (e.g. better detection, or attention to a con-
tributing factor, such as stafﬁng).
Stage 5. Identify preventive and corrective strategies. Preventive
and corrective strategies should be investigated to identify steps that
could be taken which are acceptable, feasible and affordable, and
which are not likely to result in unintended consequences. All avail-
able information should be taken into account, including details iden-
tiﬁed in previous stages and during consultations with clinical
specialists and expert organizations such as medical colleges. The
‘strength’ of draft preventive and corrective strategies can be also eval-
uated [31].
Stage 6: Develop materials for a response. This may be an ‘alert’ to
draw the attention of health care providers to new or under-recognized
risks, or risks that are not being adequately managed, and may pre-
scribe or suggest corrective strategies. A tiered response such as that
used by NHS England (Box 6) [39] may be appropriate. Examples
of alerts with and without corrective strategies are shown in Boxes 2
and 3, respectively. The tiered deﬁnitions [39] and response formats
(Box 7 [33, 40–42]) need to be ﬂexible enough to accommodate pro-
blems with very low-frequency and severe outcomes (such as
Box 4 An example of the stages of a national incident review process [33]
Stage 1: Undertake surveillance. All incidents reported and uploaded to the NRLS within the previous month and classiﬁed as
resulting in ‘severe harm’ or ‘death’ are extracted into the incident response management system.
Stage 2: Identify a ‘trigger’ incident. A Clinical Reviewer read the following report ‘Finger tourniquet left in situ for 14 days fol-
lowing minor surgery for wound debridement pulp left middle ﬁnger. Patient required amputation of ﬁnger. Initial operation
performed on day one, tourniquet discovered on day 13 and amputation of the left middle ﬁnger carried out on day 14’ and
thought that this incident may meet the criteria for a national response. It was referred to a multidisciplinary team meeting.
Stage 3: Collect like-incidents. A keyword search of the NRLS database found 149 cases. Narrative review conﬁrmed 15 relevant
incidents, six of which involved surgical gloves being used as tourniquets. The NHS Litigation Authority also had 14 relevant
claimswith the highest payment exceeding £100 000. A literature search found only two case studies reporting harm from tour-
niquets left on in error, but a paper from the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority in 2005 described 125 reports from the pre-
vious year.
Stage 4: Characterize the relevant incident type. Tourniquets are used in hand and foot surgery to obtain a bloodless ﬁeld, often
forminor surgery in settings such as emergency departments, GP surgeries and podiatry clinics. Flesh-coloured surgical gloves
are often used as they are freely available and are cheaper than tourniquets. There are no data on the relative safety of tourni-
quets and other devices (such as gloves). However, purpose-designed visible tourniquets are available and data from reported
incidents suggest that at least some of the preventable harm is caused by the use of surgical gloves. Problems of visibility with
tan-coloured tourniquets and the vulnerability of patients at the extremes of age were noted by Pennsylvania Patient Safety
Authority [34] and human factors experts.
Stage 5. Identify preventive and corrective strategies. Advice was sought from the Royal College of Surgeons and others, and
some key aspects of safer practicewere identiﬁed including (i) controlling/reconciling the number of tourniquets used via check-
lists, (ii) using purposely designed tourniquets, (iii) using tourniquets with high visibility design features, including labels and
colour and (iv) informing patients and/or family regarding the use of digital tourniquets.
Stage 6: Develop materials for a response. An action-based ‘rapid response report’ (RRR) was decided to be the most suitable
mechanism for a response.More detailed evidence on the nature of the problem and a literature reviewwas developed as ‘Sup-
porting Information’ [35]. A clinical brieﬁng [36] and a BMJ safety summary [33] were also released.
Stage 7: Pilot test and reﬁne. Deemed not necessary for this problem.
Stage 8: Disseminate alerts and corrective strategies. The one-page RRR [37] was released incorporating a description of the
issue, the scale of the problem and corrective strategies:
1. Guidelines include the removal of digital tourniquets as part of the swab counting procedure and specify the need to record
the length of time a tourniquet is in place.
2. Digital tourniquets which are labelled and/or brightly coloured should be used, in accordance with manufacturers’ instruc-
tions. Surgical gloves should not be used as tourniquets.
3. The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist should be reviewed locally to consider adding tourniquet removal at the ‘Sign Out’
stage.
4. The NPSA clinical brieﬁng sheet should be used to raise awareness of risks using digital tourniquets and safer practice re-
commendations.
Stage 9: Evaluation. Early information from the manufacturers producing tourniquets shows a 140% increase in purchasing in
the three months after the issue of the RRR compared with a similar period before issue [33]. Three months post-alert release,
no further incidents of harm from tourniquets left on after ﬁnger or toe surgery had been reported to the NRLS.
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intrathecal administration of vincristine) [43], as well as those occur-
ring at higher frequencies but with generally less severe outcomes
(such as omitted medications) [44].
Stage 7: Pilot test and reﬁne. The materials and strategies devel-
oped should be tested in pilot studies at a number of health care facil-
ities. Managers and key staff ‘on the ground’ need to be encouraged to
raise practical concerns and consider cost and service implications.
Lessons learned should be fed back to the multidisciplinary
population-level response team and used to reﬁne strategies for dis-
semination.
Stage 8: Disseminate alerts and corrective strategies. Many health
departments and governments have existing systems to disseminate
recommendations related to medicines and equipment regulation to
health care organizations. These are generally used for recall or action
when a medication or equipment safety issue has been identiﬁed. If
these systems are set up with the necessary roles and permissions,
they can also be used to disseminate the corrective strategies derived
from responses to risksmore broadly. NHS England’s Central Alerting
System [45] provides an example of such a system. The general char-
acteristics of these systems are: mandatory participation by all health
services; the ability to broadcast advice to all health services; a named
person at each health service being responsible for receipt of advice
and following up recommendations; health services being able to
view and follow their progress; and the production of status reports.
As well as the ofﬁcial dissemination channel, additional mechanisms
for communication are recommended including emails to individuals,
press releases and information sheets or articles via professional orga-
nizations.
For responses to risks which do not meet the threshold for correct-
ive strategies to be developed and disseminated, there are other op-
tions. Information about specialty-speciﬁc risks can be released via
professional bodies such as colleges or societies or published in spe-
cialist journals to target a relevant readership.
Stage 9: Evaluation. In this stage, the aim is to determine the effect-
iveness of the population-level response function including risk priori-
tization and characterization and corrective strategy dissemination
and implementation. Data sources and methods will depend on the
strategies being evaluated and could include clinical process audits,
Box 5 Criteria for identifying patient safety risks requiring
a regional or national response
A new or under-recognized risk:
• which is ‘novel’, or
• whilst not ‘novel’, is not well known or has not been
given the priority it merits, or
• involves new technologies or health care processes, or
• is part of a pattern or trend of similar but previously un-
recognized incidents
AND
There is evidence of actual or potential signiﬁcant pa-
tient harm (severity of outcome and frequency).
AND
Preventive and corrective actions are feasible, are not
already widespread and may be implemented in a cost-
effective manner.
Box 6 The three stages of NHS England alerts [39]
Stage One Alert: Warning
This stage informs organizations of emerging risk. It
can be issued very quickly once a new risk has been iden-
tiﬁed to allow rapid dissemination of information.
Stage Two Alert: Resource
This alert may be issued some weeks or months after
the stage one alert and would notify organizations of re-
sources that might include:
• sharing of examples of local good practice that miti-
gates the risk identiﬁed in the stage one alert;
• access to tools and resources that help providers im-
plement solutions to the stage one alert; and
• access to learning resources that are relevant to all
health care workers and can be used as evidence of
continued professional development.
Stage Three Alert: Directive
When this stage of alert is issued, organizations will be
required to conﬁrm they have implemented speciﬁc solu-
tions or required actions within a set timeframe. These ac-
tions will be tailored to the patient safety risk and could
include actions that are not feasible for organizations act-
ing alone (e.g. a standardization of a clinical process).
Box 7 Key characteristics of an alert
As brief as possible, a one-page summary, and, if neces-
sary referring to expanded notes on subsequent pages:
• A succinct statement of the patient safety risk
• The departments or health care provider types, or
health care staff to whom the patient safety risk is rele-
vant
• The evidence for the risk including the number of inci-
dents and the harm that resulted. Although some orga-
nizations may consider this information politically
sensitive, it is vital for clinicians and health care man-
agers to understand the level of patient harm
• Examples of incident narratives that illustrate the risk
• Recommendations (corrective strategies) that will re-
duce risks to patients—these should be clear and audit-
able (or ‘SMART’ (Speciﬁc, Measurable, Acceptable,
Responsive, Timely) [40])
• When corrective action needs to be taken or completed
by.
Other supporting information may supplement the
core one-page summary such as evidence summaries
from the incident data that prompted the corrective
strategies.
Resources to support implementation including com-
pliance checklists, good practice examples, patient infor-
mation resources, visual aids and posters. Additional
publications may be produced aimed at getting the atten-
tion of target audiences (particularly clinicians), such as
‘one-liners’ for clinical directors or doctor-friendly bulle-
tins in medical journals [33, 41, 42].
118 Hibbert et al.






equipment and medicines procurement record audits, and surveys or
interviews of clinical and administrative managers responsible for ac-
tioning the recommendations. However, it is important to note that
evaluation is seldom straightforward [4, 7]. Incident reporting rates
should not be used as a measure or subjected to statistical analysis
as they vary considerably over time, and within and between institu-
tions [7]. There are no denominators and what is reported is subject to
considerable bias [46]. Indeed, reporting rates may increase following
recommendations as awareness of the problem improves. For ex-
ample, in the period immediately after the alert on mis-selection of fe-
male urinary catheters for use in males described in Box 1 [24],
incidents which were previously seen as unexplained pain and haema-
turia were correctly recognized and reported.
Analysis, or counting, of outcomes is also problematic. Many out-
comes, such as wrong-site surgery, are too rare to ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant trends in rates [21], and attributing a change in outcomes to
the release of an alert, or an intervention, is difﬁcult due to the com-
plex nature of health care [11]. Proxy process measures have been
used. For example, 1 year after an alert recommending a lower dose
of midazolam, there was a 2- to 3-fold increase in purchasing the
lower dose [41], and 3 months after the recommendations in Box 4,
there was a 140% increase in purchasing of the digital tourniquets
[33]. Surveys may also be conducted. For example, in Pennsylvania,
Patient Safety Ofﬁcers are surveyed annually to identify recommenda-
tions that led to changes in their facility. Hundreds of examples of
changes to policies and clinical processes that positively affect safety
are received from the Patient Safety Ofﬁcers [47].
Discussion
We have presented an approach to recognizing, prioritizing, character-
izing and responding to low-frequency patient safety risks in large col-
lections of incidents. The aim is to disseminate preventive and
corrective strategies which are proportionate, achievable, cost-
effective and acceptable to the clinical community and recipients of
health care. Such a function is designed to complement, rather than
replace, the functions of local incident reporting which are fundamen-
tal components of clinical governance by providing mechanisms for a
local response to identiﬁed risks as part of a ‘duty of care’ [10].
A call for a system emulating that of the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team, incorporating multiple organizations and skill sets, con-
ﬁdentiality protections and designing and implementing strong cor-
rective strategies has been made by prominent proponents of patient
safety [48]. The principles we have outlined can be adopted with a suf-
ﬁcient number of incidents at a state or provincial level, such as New
South Wales or Pennsylvania, or across large private hospital organi-
zations. Indeed, a multinational response function is also possible and
may be desirable for countries with smaller populations and incident
databases. This may also be suitable for specialty collections, for ex-
ample, anaesthesia, radiology and radiation therapy, where incident
numbers may be lower, but still substantial.
Decisions relating to incident frequency, severity and clinical rele-
vance are often based on incomplete information and characterized by
a high level of uncertainty, even amongst experienced clinicians [11].
For example, it is difﬁcult to compare societal impact, ﬁnancial cost
and level of preventability of 20 000 incidents involving omitted med-
icines [44] and resulting in a variety of levels of harm, with the loss of
15 digits from gangrene caused by tourniquets [33]. Although we ad-
vocate a standardized system for priority setting, the variety and num-
ber of risks in a complex system such as health care means that
consistent decision-making is challenging. This strongly emphasizes
the importance of involving clinicians from a wide range of specialties
and the incorporation of human factors principles [50–52]. This is
analogous to the approach in the aviation industry, where priority is
given to the interpretative work of highly skilled analysts in under-
standing and learning from, and responding to, errors [53].
There are well-founded criticisms about incident reporting not
being representative of the harm that occurs in health care [49] as
well as incompleteness of reports raising queries about data quality.
Having access to other data sources to triangulate information derived
from incident reports may mitigate some of these concerns by provid-
ing a more complete proﬁle [50]. However, the strength of voluntary
reporting is that incidents have been prioritized by busy clinicians; this
may, in itself, positively skew reported incidents towards those where
remedial action is most likely to be needed or feasible. Additionally, in
contrast to other data sources, incident reports may contain informa-
tion on contextual and contributing factors that are valuable for ana-
lysis and corrective strategy development [11, 51].
IRSs require considerable investment [6] by way of software and
hardware infrastructure, IT support and staff time to report and man-
age incidents locally. If this investment exists in isolation from an ef-
fective population-level response function, IRSs are open to valid
criticisms with respect to their value and purpose [52]. A small, skilled
clinically led response team using a structured review process, repre-
senting a marginal additional resource, can improve efﬁciency by de-
veloping corrective strategies just once at a population level.
Challenges
Challenges to operating a population-level response function include:
• Detecting and responding to new or under-recognized threats to
patient safety must be balanced against undertaking prospective
programmes such as quality improvement initiatives to address
well-known risks. Both approaches are valuable and complemen-
tary. Indeed, these population-level response functions can still in-
form common incident types. For example, even though the NRLS
has collected over two million incidents describing inpatient falls,
and approximately one million medication incidents [12], new and
under-recognized risks continue to emerge and may be the subject
of alerts [54, 55].
• Determining the threshold for issuing new directives and deﬁning
the number which should be released every year. The capacity of
the health care system to respond to recommendations is ﬁnite,
with competing demands from local IRSs and complaints, medica-
tion, equipment and blood product regulators and health-care
accreditation and regulation agencies.
• Ensuring that channels within healthcare organizations to dissem-
inate relevant safety information to clinicians are adequate. For ex-
ample, in England, around half of NHS trusts cannot communicate
effectively and reliably with their junior doctors [56] posing chal-
lenges to inform them of relevant safety risks.
Conclusion
Signiﬁcant resources have been invested in IRSs, and the value of these
has been challenged. We have outlined the key features of a
population-level function to recognize and respond to risks using clin-
ical expertise. The incremental cost of such a function is modest com-
pared with the cost of deploying the ‘reporting’ element. Combining
both clinical and human factors analyses at the heart of the response
is likely to create credible and acceptable risk identiﬁcation processes
and preventive and corrective strategies.
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Whether a national function to respond to patient safety risks
is necessary can be answered with the following questions: if, at a
hospital in your country, a tourniquet was left on a patient’s post-
surgical ﬁnger—causing gangrene from ischaemia necessitating ampu-
tation, would other hospitals be informed, and how would this occur?
Would recommendations be developed to reduce the incident happen-
ing again to another patient in your country? Would hospitals be
under any obligation to implement the recommendations? Or, how
would clinical staff, patients and their relatives feel if they discovered
that many similar incidents had been reported, but no-one had acted
on these to alert other hospitals?
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